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I. Introduction*
Liberalization in service markets has received increased
attention in recent years. Above all, the ongoing GATT
negotiations of the Uruguay-Round are stimulating the dis-
cussion. Yet the number of countries which have adopted a
deregulation approach to services is limited. And little
attention has been paid to the experience of developing
countries in this area. In common perception liberalizing
international transactions in services is a North-South-issue
with expected gains from trade for industrial countries at
the expense of the developing world (see, e.g. Sapir, 1985;
Randhawa, 1987). But also within industrial countries many
concerns are brought forward - notably by well established
producers on sheltered domestic markets. On the other hand,
some developing countries are increasingly aware of the
potential contribution of services for the improvement of
their overall export performance and current accounts.
In the following, an attempt is made to reveal the impact of
government regulations on international transactions in
services and to evaluate the opportunities of developing
countries in open service markets. In the first section,
some global trends and theoretical considerations on inter-
national trade and foreign direct investments in services
are presented. In the second section the nature and signi-
ficance of government regulations in different service
industries are discussed. The final section provides some
tentative conclusions from the experience of those countries
that recently deregulated particular service industries.
The author is grateful to Rolf J. Langhammer for many
helpful comments.-. *3 _
II. Transaction costs and international trade in services
The importance of services in international trade is less
pronounced than in production. Services account for about
50 percent of world output (table 1)), whereas their share
in world exports is less than 20 percent . Presumably, the
comparably low exposure to international competition is pri-
marily caused by the existence of substantial transaction
costs associated with transborder flows of services (Rugman,
1986). Such costs may result from specific production tech-
niques and/or policy measures affecting international trade.
With respect to the first type, the whole service sector
could be divided into three groups (Bhagwati, 1987):
- In the first group, consumers move to producers in order
to receive the offered service. Personal.services and re-
tail trade are examples (mobile user, immobile provider).
- In the second group, producing the respective services in
associated with a spatial movement of the producer to the
consumer. This mainly applies to the whole transport sec-
tor (mobile provider, immobile user).
- In the final group no direct contacts between producers
and consumers and no spatial movements of persons are
required. These movements . are substituted by transborder
flows of information. Examples are given by telecommunica^
tions or financial services (physical proximity inessen-
tial) . •- . .
According to Bhagwati (1984) , activities of the first two
groups might be referred to as "embodied" services, whereas
Here and in the following, "investment income", and "offi-
cial goods services and income" are excluded from total
trade in services. The analysis concentrates, therefore,
mainly on services produced by business enterprises.
Corresponding to most other studies construction is not
treated as service industry.- 4 -















































Source:: World Bank (various issues); own calculation.
those of the third group are "disembodied" ones . No doubt,
the border lines between these three categories are somewhat
arbitrary and perhaps changing over time. Nevertheless, they
allow to classify different types of services with conside-
ration of transaction costs in international trade.
Apparently, transaction costs are extremely high in the
first group. As a consequence, international trade in per-
sonal services, e.g., is quite unimportant. In the second
group there are many opportunities of reducing transaction
costs by increasing capital-intensity of production. There
are much more economies of scale to be exploited in trans-
port services than in personal services. Now and then, these
capital-intensive services are labelled as "smokestack ser-
vices" (Aronson, Cowhey, 1984). In the group of disembodied
services, finally, transaction costs are mainly determined
by the availability of information and communication tech-
nologies. Due to rapid technical progress in microelectro-
nics transaction costs in trading disembodied services nowa-
days often are even lower than transaction costs in merchan-
dise trade.
In Bhagwati (1987) disembodied services are denoted as
"long-distance services".- 5 -
Moreover, decreasing information and communication costs
give rise to a shift of production techniques. Notably in
business services telephone calls and other forms of elec-
tronic communication are increasingly substituting personal
talks. By means of this process of "disembodiment" (Bhag-
wati, 1984) there is a continuous transition from embodied
to disembodied production techniques in the service sector.
Due to comparably low transaction costs substantial interna-
tional trade flows could occur in disembodied services and
in capital-intensive embodied services as well. Only in
labour-intensive embodied services tradeability seems to be
quite low (table 2). Subsequently, international trade in


























































services concentrates on transport (with the exception of
local transport, which is included in "other transport"),
communication, banking, insurance, and business services.
As a result of the growing importance of services in world
output and of the ongoing process of disembodiment within
the service sector it should be expected, that the growth
rates of service exports would exceed those of merchandise
exports. As a matter of fact, however, the share of services
in world exports decreased in the seventies, whereas in the
eighties exports of services just kept pace with exports of
goods (table 3) .
Within the service sector, the development of international
2
trade was somewhat distinct :
,- The share of labour-intensive embodied services (travel)
in world trade was reduced in the seventies and remained
stable in the eighties.
- The share of capital-intensive embodied services (trans-
port) was decreasing over the whole period.
- Disembodied services (other private services) is the only
category that shows a slightly increasing share in both
sub-periods.
All in all, the trade performance of services as compared to
merchandise trade is disappointing. The comparably low level
of service exports may be explained by remaining differences
in transaction costs; the low rate of export growth, how-
ever, is in contradiction to the growing share of services
In order to. avoid distortions from cyclical fluctuations
peaks of the business cycle were chosen as benchmark-
years. ..'..: .
For a definition of different service categories in ba-
lance of payments statistics see IMF (a).- 7 -



























































































































































































(b) Including freight insurance. - (c) Including other private goods and income.
Source: IMF (b); own calculations.- 8 -
in output and the process of disembodiment within the ser-
vice sector. It has to be explained, therefore, by artifi-
cial barriers to trade, especially by the existence of
government regulations in service .markets. The discrepancies
between potential and actual export growth of services point
out, that these barriers are affecting the export opportuni-
ties of industrial countries and developing countries as
well.
Several attempts have been made to evaluate the potential
outcome of international trade in services under the regime
of liberalized world markets. Those studies point out, in
general, that there is no systematic difference in trading
goods and trading services. In other words, the Ricardo-
theorem of comparative costs would also apply to services
(for a summary of this discussion see Deardorff, 1984;
Stern, 1984; Krommenacker, 1984). A Heckscher-Ohlin model of
international trade would predict, therefore, a comparative
advantage and a corresponding trade-surplus of industrial
countries in human-capital intensive services, whereas deve-
loping countries would specialize on labour intensive and
perhaps on physical-capital intensive services .
In fact, however, international trade is not dominated by
such inter-industry patterns, but by intra-industry trade.
Nowadays, a substantial part of international trade is a
two-way road even within single product categories. This
A sustainable comparative advantage of a country might be
etablished only by the endowment with comparably immobile
production factors (Learner, 1984, p. 22). While unskilled
labour and human capital might be regarded, by and large,
as immobile factors, physical capital has proved to be a
factor of high international mobility. In consequence,
capital-intensity of exports could not be explained by the
endowment of ' countries with physical capital (Leontief-
paradox), but by international differences in rates of
return and, more important, by production complementari-
ties between physical capital and unskilled labour. For an
estimate of : factor intensities of U.S. multinationals
exports of goods and services see Kravis, Lipsey (1986).- 9 -
increasingly applies to north-south trade as well, which
primarily consisted of inter-industry trade relations in the
past. It might be expected, hence, that a world-wide dere-
gulation approach to services would bring about an increase
of intra-industry trade in services. As a consequence, both
imports and exports of services would probably be higher in
industrial countries and developing countries as well
(Schott, Mazza, 1986).




Before entering into details of government regulations in
different service industries it seems appropriate to analyse
the impact of regulations on international transactions in
the context of modern trade theory. A graphical illustration
could help to explain the decisive points of such an
approach.
In figure 1 the left-hand side and the right-hand side repre^
sent two markets for one product in different countries. It
is assumed that the total costs of production consist of
constant marginal costs, plant-specific fixed costs and some
additional fixed costs, which are enterprise-specific but
not plant-specific (brand name, R&D etc.). Thus, average
cost-curves are downward sloping. In addition, production
technology is assumed to be ubiquitous.
The company facing the cost-curve AC , hereafter called the
parent company, is selling the quantity OA on its home mar-
ket. The cost-curve of a foreign affiliate (AC ) runs below
the cost-curves of independent companies (AC), since the
affiliate does not carry the burden of enterprise-specific
fixed costs. It is assumed that there are not substantial




Production costs of parent company, foreign
affiliate and independent competitor
B quantity
ACp - average costs of parent company
ACQ - average costs of foreign affiliate
ACp - average costs of parent company including transaction costs in
international trade
ACj - average costs of independent company
0A - sales in the home country of the parent company
AB - sales in the foreign country
CD - transaction costs in international trade per unit of output
bably could offset the cost-advantage of foreign affiliates
over independent competitors. The parent company itself
faces a cost disadvantage on foreign markets arising from
some sort of the above mentioned transactions costs in
international trade, which - for simplicity - are assumed to
be porportionate to the units of output sold abroad (AC ).
In this model, the international division of labour is
mainly determined by three different types of costs
(Helpman, 1984):
- Comparably high transaction costs in international trade
(including artificial trade barriers) are unfavourable to
exports and are promoting foreign direct investment and/or
entry of independent competitors.
- Comparably high enterprise-specific fixed costs are favou-
rable to foreign direct investments.
- Comparably high costs of monitoring production abroad are
favourable to- exports and/or entry of independent
competitors.,,. .'••.••..- 11 -
With the cost structure given in figure 1 parent company's
exports of the quantity AB would be more profitable than
raising a foreign affiliate or market entry of independent
competitors.
In this context, government.regulations could be interpreted
as shifts of average cost-curves. The introduction of trade
regulations would be equivalent to an upward shift of AC ,
thus promoting foreign direct investment and attracting
domestic firms. Operating restrictions on multinational cor-
porations, on the other hand, would bring about additional
costs to foreign affiliates and would result in an upward
shift of AC . Such regulations would create exports of the
parent company and/or entry of new firms. Restrictions on
entry, finally, would raise the cost-curves AC and AC. and
a 1
would probably result in increasing exports of the parent
company. Hence, a survey of existing regulations in service
markets should pay attention to the types of international
transactions that are affected.
2. 5§2yl§tions_in_garticular_industries
All over the world services are the subject of abundant and
intensive government regulations. In India, for example, no
foreign insurance company is allowed to operate; in Spain
foreign banks are prohibited from equity participation in
domestic companies; in West Germany retail shops are to be
bound to close at 6.30 pm and brokers are not allowed to
offer contracts with foreign insurance companies; in Pakis-
tan theatres are required to devote 15 percent of playing
time to local films; in Sweden advertising is prohibited on
radio and television and printed advertising materials are
subject to tax; and in Canada banks are prohibited from
offering computer services other than those related to ban-
king .
For a survey of regulations in different service indus-
tries see GATT (1985), World Bank (1987); Walter (1985),
Hindley (1982), OECD (1984, 1986), Subcommittee on Mer-
chant Marine (1984).- 12 -
Most of
; these regulations are allegedly enacted to protect
consumers. In banking and insurance, regulations centrally
aim at avoiding the risks of insolvency and securing the
effectiveness of national central bank policies. Since con-
trol of foreign suppliers by national authorities is limit-
ed, governments prefer strong import restrictions. As a
result, domestic banking and insurance companies are shel-
tered from foreign competition to a large extent. In air
transport, too, restrictions are in general motivated by
protecting the consumer, especially with respect to high
safety quality. These standards are accompanied by import
controls in form of restrictive landing rights. In communi-
cation services regulations are intended to prevent consu-
mers from unfair pricing of pretended^natural monopolies. In
most cases governments themselves reserve to the monopoly on
installation and operation of telecommunication facilities.
Some regulations explicitly aim at preventing domestic com-
panies from foreign competition. Especially in maritime
transport a complex system of cargo reservations is restric-
ting international trade. But also in those industries,
where the protection of consumers is the pretended rationale
of regulation, the true end of these measures is often to be
found in the protection of domestic producers (see, e.g.,
Findlay, 1984).
Of course, some of these regulations are reasonable means of
reducing the risks of market failures. It is widely recogni-
zed, for example, that the comprehensive reforms of banking
in Chile during the late seventies went much too far (World
Bank, 1987). In this industry some sort of government con-
trols like reserve requirements or mandatory asset ratios
would improve market performance. The same probably applies
to surveillance over insurance companies and to minimum
standards on aeronautic safety. In most countries, however,
the extent of, sophisticated regulation networks obviously
exceeds sound-safeguards against market failures.Blbliofhek
des Institute fur Weltwirtschaft
- 13 -
As a common attribute of government regulations, the allo-
cation of resources will be distorted, the efficiency of
production processes is reduced, and output prices of regu-
lated industries are above world-market prices. Protecting
some industries is always equivalent to discriminating all
others, especially those which depend upon inputs of protec-
ted industries .
Due to the broad range and complexity of government regula-
tions in services it is infeasible to give a comprehensive
overview of all measures at a disaggregated sectoral and
regional level. Available information suggests, however,
that communication, banking and insurance are generally
regulated strongest (table 4). In addition, there are subs-
tantial regulations in air transport and maritime transport
imposed by national aeronautic authorities and the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association (IATA) and by cargo reser-
vation systems respectively. In other transport (especially
freight motor carriers) and in business services, by con-
trast, the significance of government regulations is limi-
ted. In retail trade and personal services, finally, inter-
national tradeability still is quite low and restrictions on
international transactions would be redundant.
With respect to the type of restricted activities, regula-
tions are concentrated on transborder flows of services. Of
course, there are severe restrictions on market entry and
operation of business as well. By and large, however,
imports of services are more affected by government regula-
tions than foreign direct investment in service industries.
In accordance with the model presented above it should be
expected, hence, that an intensified international division
of labour would show up rather in an increase of foreign
direct investment than in increased imports and exports.
For an estimate of the costs of protection in insurance
see Hindley (1982). For an international comparison of
efficiency in the banking system see Hanson, de Rezende
Rocha (1986).- 14 -
Table 4 - Main fields of government regulations in different




























As stated above, trade in services amounts to about 20 per-
cent of total world trade. There is no corresponding infor-
mation available, however, on the ratio of world foreign
direct investment in service industries to total foreign
direct investment. Only a few countries are reporting such
data. For three of these countries a share of 30 to 50 per-
cent of services in total foreign direct investment is to be
observed (table 5). And this share is increasing over time
for each country.
This increase is most distinct in the sub-group of Asian
countries, which includes some developing and newly indus-
trializing countries. Within the service sector banking and
finance accounts for less than 50 percent. Foreign direct
investment in other service industries is rapidly expanding
too, especially in business services. A similar pattern
shows up in foreign direct investment of four industrial
countries in ASEAN countries (table Al in the appendix) .
For further analysis of the sectoral structure of foreign
different investment in ASEAN countries see Hiemenz, Lang-
hammer et al. (1987), Pangestu (1987).- 15 -
Table 5 - Foreign direct investment of three industrial countries by































































(a) Including agriculture, mining, construction, utilities. -











Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand.
Source: Gobel, Langhammer, Weiss (1988); Deutsche Bundesbank (1987);
own calculations.
As transaction costs in international trade in services have
actually declined, the discrepancy between trade and invest-
ment expansion could not be attributed to intrinsic (natu-
ral) trade barriers arising from low tradeability of servi-
ces. Instead, it appears to be the result of substantial
artificial trade barriers raised by government regulations.
These barriers (as artificial barriers always do) make it
profitable to look for loopholes in the system of protection
for domestic firms. For escaping trade restrictions the
establishment of foreign affiliates has become a dominant
business strategy on attractive foreign markets.
This not only applies to developing countries. In West Ger-
many, for example, foreign direct investment is increasing
much more rapidly than trade in services. Within ten years
the amount of foreign direct investment in services doubled,
whereas foreign investment in manufacturing almost remained
constant (table 6). In West German total imports and ex-- 16 -
ports, however, the share of services amounts to a rather
stable level of 25 percent and 15 percent respectively.
Table 6 - Cumulated foreign direct investment in West































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1987); own calculations.
Subsequently, the world-wide increase of foreign direct
investment in services should probably not be attributed to
a low tradeability, but to a rapidly increasing potential of
international transactions in services. It is realised in
foreign direct investment and is still latent in interna-
tional trade. This conclusion suggests, therefore, that
liberalization of trade in services could substantially
promote overall international trade and could bring about a
further intensified international division of labour.
IV. Liberalization and market performance in selected
service industries
In recent years deregulation of services has become a lively
economic and policy issue. In most countries, however, con-
crete steps towards an opening of service markets are rather
reluctant and incomprehensive. Nevertheless, there are some
exceptions that could provide useful insights in the impact
of deregulation on market performance. Especially in the
United States several major service markets have been libe-- 17 -
ralized since the late seventies. In addition, the Japanese
and the British government are striving for some deregula-
tion of service industries. In continental Europe, on the
other hand, the regulatory system in services has remained
rather unchanged.
The same applies to most developing countries, and within
these countries especially to maritime transport, travel and
communication. There were carried out, however, some experi-
ments in deregulating financial markets, which deserve a
closer look.
As a matter of fact, there are no clear-cut and commonly
accepted lessons about the assessment of deregulation acti-
vities in developed and developing countries. Separating the
impact of such policies from other determinants of economic
activity is, of course, a difficult task. A brief survey of
different case studies on this subject could provide, how-
ever, some tentative conclusions at least.
of _iDdustrial_countries
In this context, the analysis of deregulation policies
should concentrate on services of a comparably high level of
international tradeability . In telecommunications, to start
with, administrative restrictions are related to network
services and customer devices. On the latter market a world-
wide trend of increased competition is to be observed. On
network and service markets, on the other hand, there are
only a few examples of liberalization.
The most comprehensive approach to deregulation of tele-
communications was adopted in the United States. It already
For a comprehensive discussion of regulations in services
and deregulation policies in industrial countries see
Soltwedel et al. (1986) and the contributions to Giersch
(1987). For a comparison of regulations in Great Britain
and West Germany see Peacock (1984). For a survey of regu-
lations in West Germany see Donges, Schatz (1986).- 18 -
started in 1956, when the market of private branch exchanges
(PBXs) was opened to competition. Despite these efforts,
however, American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) was suc-
cessful in protecting its monopoly position for customer
devices for many -years. In order to avoid damages of the
network every customer was obliged to use an adapter exclu-
sively sold by AT&T. High prices of these adapters appeared
to be a substantial barrier to entry for new competitors. In
1977, this regulation was substituted by technical standards
for telephone devices, which were controlled by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). In consequence, new en-
trants got access to the market and competition was in-
creased. In addition several steps towards liberalizing
value-added services were achieved during the seventies. In
1983, also the network was deregulated by the break-up of
AT&T.
All in all, the results of deregulating telecommunication in
the United States could be summarized as follows:
- The number of competitors increased. For example, the
market share of Western Electric (a former affiliate of
AT&T) in customer devices was reduced from 80 percent in
1970 to about 40 percent in 1985. Moreover, many new firms
entered the market of telecommunication services, namely
of value-added services.
- Product diversity extended. The availability of different
services and devices was enhanced due to the market en-
trance of new competitors and intensified competition
among existing firms.
- Prices of long-distance telephone calls declined by 15 to
30 percent. Since cross-subsidizing of different services
was not feasible any longer, the prices of local area
calls actually rose. On average the prices of telephone
calls as a whole decreased by 5 to 6 percent (Soltwedel et
al. , 1986) . ... :- 19 -
In Japan the monopoly positions of the state-owned company
Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) in domestic telecommu-
nication services and of Kokusai Denshin Denwa (KDD) in
international telecommunication activities were ceased in
1985. In addition, several government regulations on custo-
mer devices were dismissed at that time. In February 1987,
finally, NTT was privatized.
In September 1987 three new firms entered the domestic tele-
communication market: Daini-Denden Inc., a conglomerate of
225 firms under the leadership of Kyocera (an electrical
machinery company); Japan Teleway, a conglomerate of
290 firms under the leadership of Toyota Motors; and Japan
Telecom, a conglomerate of 301 different firms. These new
competitors are already providing long-distance calls at a
price that is about 20 percent below the price of respective
NTT-services.
In transborder telecommunications two new competitors final-
ly succeeded in entering the market of KDD, namely Interna-
tional Telecom Japan (a conglomerate of Mitsubishi, Mitsui,
Sumitomo, Matsushita and others) and International Digital
Communications Planning Inc. (established by the British
company Cable & Wireless, the US-companies Merryll Lynch and
Pacific Telesis, and the Japanese companies C. Itoh and
Toyota Motor).
Due to this increase of competition further price-cuts of
telecommunication services and substantial additional in-
vestment in network facilities are to be expected. Cable &
Wireless has announced, for example, the installation of an
optical fiber connection from the United States via Japan to
Hongkong - a project of about 280 Mill. US Dollars that will
be finished until the end of 1989.
In Great Britain deregulation of telecommunications took
place in the early eighties. It started with the break-up of
British Telecom (BT) in 1981 and was finalized by the priva-- 20 -
tization of BT in 1984. These measures were accompanied by
liberalization of service and customer device markets
(Carter, 1987). Up to 1984, 72 new sellers of value-added
services entered the market and it is estimated that the
prices of telephone calls have declined by 15 percent in the
meantime.
Another often cited example of deregulated services is the
case of air-traffic in the United States. It started in 1978
with the Airline Deregulation Act, which brought about a
substantial decrease in market concentration and a decline
in prices for domestic flights of about 15 percent from 1977
to 1983. In addition, total employment in air transport rose
by 8 percent (Soltwedel et al., 1986). In recent years, some
newly founded carriers have disappeared, but prices of air
transport services are still lower than under the regime of
strongly regulated markets. According to Kahn (1983) event
the safety of flights was not affected by deregulation. On
the contrary, the number of mortal accidents per mile
slightly declined as compared to the early seventies.
A deregulation of trucking was - at least partially - achie-
ved in Switzerland (since 1951), in Australia (since 1954),
in Great Britain (since 1968), and in the United States
(since 1980). The available information suggests, by and
large, that also in these cases output prices were lowered,
productive efficiency was increased, product diversity was
improved, and monopoly rents have almost disappeared (Laaser,
1986). Apparently, the same applies to the deregulation of
bus transport in Great Britain, that was enforced by the
Transport Act of 1980 and the Public Passenger Vehicles Act
of 1981.
With regard to financial institutions the evidence of dere-
gulation in industrial countries appears to be somewhat
equivocal. Luxembourg, for example, has opened its markets
for foreign banks and, in consequence, could establish a new
and rapidly growing centre of world capital markets. In the- 21 -
United States deregulation centrally aimed at dismissing
several operating restrictions (Streit, 1986). On the other
hand, there are also some elements of reregulation to be
observed. As a result, the number of financial service
offerings increased substantially. The impact of this policy
framework on interest rates-and the stability of the finan-
cial system, however, is less obvious (Evanoff, 1985; Good-
hart et al., 1987). Presumably, monitoring a sound deregu-
lation policy in financial markets is far more difficult in
banking than in other service industries (Neu, 1986).
The above listed examples are briefly covering the main
approaches to deregulation of services in industrial coun-
tries. Particular countries not mentioned here are, by and
large, still preserving a high level of administrative
restrictions, namely in transport, communication, banking
and insurance. Above all, in continental Europe governments
are still reluctant to liberalization policies. Deregulation
of services will remain, therefore, an important policy issue
in years to come.
2. Liberalization of services in developing countries:
the case of financial markets
As compared to industrial countries, case studies on deregu-
lating services in developing countries are rather limited.
Most of them are concerned to financial services, which have
been subject to dramatic shifts of market structure and out-
put performance in recent years. In this industry several
operating restrictions obviously are necessary in order to
facilitate sound macroeconomic monetary policy and to sta-
bilize the financial system of an economy. A comprehensive
deletion of administrative restrictions, including reserve
requirements and mandatory asset ratios, would probably
result in a deletion of the financial market itself .
As mentioned above, Chile gives an example of excessive
deregulation policies in banking. For an assessment of
this experiment see World Bank (1987) .- 22 -
On the other hand, the development of financial markets
seems to be of essential importance in the process of indus-
trialization. In the past, many government regulations have
proved to be serious impediments to overall economic growth
in some developing-countries. Nowadays, it is widely recog-
nized, for example, that administrative restrictions such as
interest rate ceilings or foreign exchange controls will not
increase domestic investment but reduce savings and stimu-
late (illegal) capital exports . Governments should concen-
trate, therefore, on such restrictions that are indispen-
sable instruments of controlling the aggregate supply of
money.
In some respect, the enforcement of a credible monetary
policy would require particular restrictions on interna-
tional finance as well. In the absence of such complementary
regulations the objectives of monetary control might be
undermined by the presence of financial institutions based
abroad. In many countries, however, administrative restric-
tions on international trade and investment in financial
services are strongly influenced by (rent-seeking) import
competing banks. In an international comparison of 141 coun-
tries it was observed that only thirteen did not impose
explicit entry restrictions on foreign banks and three
others prohibited only the acquisition of majority interest
in existing banks (Walter, 1985). In the remaining countries
a variety of different restrictions, ranging from market
delineation acts to rather arbitrary growth and funding
limits, could be observed.
In this context, detailed information on the presence of
foreign banks and on entry restrictions for branch offices
are provided for a sample of 9 developing countries (ta-
For the experience of Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and
Indonesia with exchange rate ceilings see Fischer (1982).- 23 -
ble 7). In addition, data on exports of "other private
goods, services and income" are shown, that are derived from
international balance of payments statistics. This item
covers exports of financial services and it should be expec-
ted that these exports would reach a comparably high level
in countries with low entry- barriers to foreign banks. The
relative importance of such exports is measured by a compa-
rison to the total amount of merchandise exports.
Table 7 - Entry restrictions facing foreign banking firms and export






























































































Source: Walter (1985); IMF (b); own calculations.- 24 -
In 1979, the ratio of service exports to merchandise exports
was above average in almost all countries that were not re-
stricting entry of foreign banks. In addition, the Republic
of Korea could achieve a good performance in service ex-
ports. Presumably, entry barriers were redundant at that
time or were outmatched by internal liberalization activi-
ties (Yew, 1986; Dee, 1986). In 1985, however, the impor-
tance of Korean service exports had substantially declined.
In most other countries and in the developing world as a
whole exports of services were growing more rapidly than
merchandise exports. This evidence suggests that liberali-
zation policies related to foreign banks could bring about a
substantial increase of service exports.
In recent years, discussion has focussed on offshore bank-
ing . By the establishment of such centres, it is argued, a
country may yield the benefits from international banking
without suffering from disturbances on local financial mar-
kets. An offshore-banking centre is mainly characterized by
- business activities carried out only in foreign currencies
and with non-residents,
- the absence of artificial regulations such as exchange
controls, asset ratios or taxes on earnings and transac-
tions.
Consequently, competition is fierce and spreads between de-
posit and lending rates are low. The stability of these mar-
kets is not guaranteed by any official "lender of last re-
sort", but by business connections to parent companies and,
in a sense, by some moral commitments of the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements and the IMF (Walter, 1985). Essential
preconditions for the successful establishment of such cen-
For a summary of this discussion see Valentine (1985) and
Choi (1986).- 25 -
tres seem to be political stability of the host country and
the availability of adequate communication facilities.
Direct benefits for the host country are limited, because
even minimal levels of taxation can quickly price a centre
out of the market. There are, however, substantial indirect
benefits arising from a transfer of banking know-how and a
stimulus to domestic financial markets. Moreover, offshore
banks are often attracting complementary services like
international monetary brokers, factoring and leasing compa-
nies or insurance and reinsurance institutions. Hence, the
development of other industries and of the whole economy
might be enhanced. Due to these advantages the number of
countries that decide to enter this market is still growing.
Two of the most impressive examples of raising an offshore-
banking centre are provided by Singapore and Bahrain. In
Singapore, offshore banking has started in 1968. Nowadays,
this country has become one of the most important financial
centres of that region next to Hong Kong . Expansion was
even more rapid in Bahrain, where offshore banking started
in 1975. It has become the main centre for the recycling of
Petro-Dollars and is especially engaged in financial
services submitted to Saudi-Arabian clients (Seznec, 1987) .
As many offshore banks are not obliged to disclose their
business activities to national authorities, statistical in-
formation on profitability and actual international transac-
tions is limited. In Bahrain, for example, only those banks
engaged in domestic and offshore markets as well are re-
quired to report their activities to the Bahraini govern-
ment. It should be expected, that officially documented ser-
For a detailed survey of financial markets and institu-
tions in Singapore see Huat (1985)•- 26 -
Table 8 - Exports of other private goods, services and in-






























establishment of offshore ban-
king. Other offshore-banking countries, that are not
reporting service exports : Bermuda
(1979), Hong Kong, Lebanon, Liberia
(1963), St. Christopher and Nevis
Lebanon and Liberia restrictions of
never existed. - (b) 1984•
(1969), Cayman Islands
, Netherlands Antilles
(1983). In Hong Kong,
offshore banking
Source: IMF (1986); own calculations.
vice exports do not include, in general, offshore banking
services. A favourable export performance of offshore-ban-
king countries in the category of "other private goods, ser-
vices and income" could be attributed, therefore, primarily
to exports of complementary services attracted.
As a matter of fact, offshore-banking countries appear to be
highly competitive service exporters (table 8). The indirect
benefits from liberalized offshore markets appear to be very
substantial. Of course, some offshore activities are carried
out at the expense of government revenues elsewhere. To some
extent, these centres could also be regarded as important
conduits in laundering of "dirty", money (Beard, 1986) . In
consequence, some pressure for extended supervision of off-
shore activities is to be expected for the future. In gener-
al, however, offshore markets have proved to be efficient
institutions of.international capital transactions.- 27 -
V. Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper was to demonstrate, both
theoretically and empirically, how government regulations of
service industries are affecting international transactions.
By and large, international trade in services is more res-
tricted than foreign direct investment. This regulatory pat-
tern could explain, why the expansion of international trade
in services appeared to be very disappointing as compared to
the rich opportunities arising from the advent of new tech-
nologies in disembodied services. To some degree these impe-
diments to an intensified international division of labour
have been offset by rapidly increasing foreign direct in-
vestment in service industries. Such substitution strategies
were probably reducing the welfare-losses resulting from
trade barriers, but they cannot completely compensate them.
The potential benefits from deregulation policies are dis-
cussed for industrial countries and developing countries as
well. Several case studies for industrial countries have im-
pressively revealed that in deregulated industries industri-
al concentration is lower, productive efficiency is higher,
product diversity is greater and output prides are lower
than in strongly restricted industries. In developing coun-
tries some deregulation experiments in services have been
carried out in financial markets. The evidence clearly sug-
gests the existence of substantial positive externalities of
liberalizing financial services. Deregulation of onshore and
offshore financial markets apparently attracts complementary
services, promotes service exports and could help in improv-
ing current accounts.
Moreover, it should be considered that domestic firms could
be made more efficient by their exposure to international
competition. Such improvements could be achieved, of course,
not only in banking and finance, but also in other service
industries. The strong commitments of governments to regula-- 28 -
tions in services appear to be, in general, beneficial only
to particular protected producers, but ihflictive to overall
economic development.
With this in mind, progressive GATT-negotiations on trade in
services would unlikely result in a zero-sum game. Instead,
substantial gains from trade might accrue to each participant.- 29 -











































































(a) Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand. -






















Source: Langhammer, Gross (1986).- 30 -
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